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Abstract:  The  ratio  of  retirees  to  workers  in  developed  countries  is  expected  to 
increase sharply in the next few decades. In the presence of unfunded income support 
policies, this increase in old age dependency is expected to increase the future fiscal 
burden which is seen as a threat to living standards. This paper quantifies the ability 
of private intergenerational transfers to alleviate the future fiscal burden of ageing. 
This  is  done  through  developing  an  extended  dynamic  overlapping  generations 
simulation  model  with  realistic  demographics.  Calculation  based  on  steady  state 
simulations suggests that a bequest to GDP ratio of 1% offsets about 33.3 % of the 
fiscal burden over the lifecycle when measured as a % of simple labour income and 
8.9% of the fiscal burden when measured as % of the full income. The model is 
calibrated for Australia under small open economy assumption such that the optimal 
solution  mimic  important  cross  sectional  and  time  series  fundamentals  of  the 
Australian  Economy.  Intergenerational  accounting  suggests  that  the  empirically 
plausible intergenerational transfers are strong enough to offset most of the tax burden 
(81 to 91%) when measured as % of simple labour income and up to ¼ of the burden 
when fiscal burden is measured as % of full income. In the endogenous labour supply 
case, 81 to 91 percent of the fiscal burden of ageing will be alleviated by inheritances 
in  the  base  case.  Due  to  the  calibration  strategy  adopted,  the  paper  analytically 
demonstrates that results of the simulations are robust to the introduction of lifetime 
uncertainty in the model where people discount the future by a rate of time preference 
and by a survival probability irrespective of whether there are perfect annuity markets 
or no annuity markets at all. 
 






1.  Introduction 
Most of the developed and some developing countries are undergoing or projected to 
experience a significant change in their demographic structure. Population projections 
under alternative assumptions about fertility, mortality and immigration reveal that the 
proportion of retired population, those 65 and above as percentage of total population, 
will grow sharply. For example in Australia, alternative population projection reveal 
that the ratio of retirees to total population will increase by more than 10 percentage 
point, nearly double the current level, in the next few decades. 
 
With  unfunded  income support  policies  in  place,  this  ageing  of  the  population  is 
projected to significantly increase future fiscal burden of the ageing population which 
is seen as a threat to future living standards. Because saving is a means to redistribute 
living standards over time, researchers have debated the optimal response of national 
saving to offset adverse effects of the fiscal burden due to ageing. There has been a 
difference of opinion as to whether the optimal response to an ageing population is an 
increase in national saving or a decrease. Some have called for a significant increase 
in  the  level  of  saving  (Guest  and  McDonald  (2001),  OECD  (1996),  Fitzgerald 
(1993),), whereas others have proposed the opposite (Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann 
and  Nicoleti  (1989),  Cutler,  Poterba,  Sheiner,  and  Summers  (1990),  Auerbach, 
Kotlikoff and Cia (1990), Elmendorf and Sheiner (1990) and Miles (1999)). 
 
Raffelhuschen  (1999)  and  Kotlikoff  and  Raffelhuschen  (1999)  generational 
accounting studies found that 19 out of the 22 countries investigated exhibit a fiscal 
imbalance to the disadvantage of future generations. These accountings, like many 
others, focus on public intergenerational transfers (such as social security, health care 
and old-age care) as pointed out by Lueth (2003) and ignore the role played by private 
intergenerational transfers. Lueth (2003) uses an overlapping generations model to 
investigate the potential of private intergenerational transfers to alleviate the fiscal 
burden  of  population  ageing.  The  fiscal  burden  is  modelled  as  a  PAYG  pension 
scheme. Lueth argues that due to decline in the number of bequestees, inheritances are 
expected to increase. The parameter that quantifies the intensity of bequests is set 
such that bequest turns out to be 5.8% of GDP which corresponds to the German 
circumstances. This increase is however insufficient to make up for the fiscal burden 
induced by demographic change.  
 
Lueth (2003) however uses a two period overlapping generations model which does 
not capture true structure of an economy. Theoretical properties of the model do not 
carry  well  to  a  model  with  multiple  overlapping  generations.  Individuals  in  the 
Lueth’s model expect to live for two periods (working in the first period and retired in 
the second) where every body lives through the first period and a fraction of them die 
prematurely in the beginning of the second period. Short lived individuals therefore 
leave accidental bequests only at the end of the one period working life.  
 
This  paper  however  argues,  and  simulations  confirm  it  later,  that  most  of  the 
accidental  bequests  are  left  by  the  retired  population.  Since  the  issue  is  one  of 
quantification, its important to bring some more realism into the model. Khan (2006) 
simulated earlier version of the extended model where labour supply was assumed to  
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be  exogenous  to  study  the  impact  population  ageing  on  living  standards  and  the 
optimal response of national saving, investment and current balance to prospective 
ageing in Australia. The paper allows labour supply to be endogenously determined. 
On the theoretical sides, Khan (2006) modelled four aspects of a demographically 
changing  economy.  These  aspects  were  (i)  young  and  old-age  dependencies  (the 
proportion of retired pensioners and young dependents to the working population), (ii) 
the changing productivity of individuals as they age, (iii) the age-varying nature of 
consumption  demands  (following  Cutler  et  al  (1990)  and  Guest  and  McDonald 
(2001)),  and  (iv)  in  an  economy  with  altruistic  agents  or  in  case  of  accidental 
premature  deaths,  the  number  of  bequests  recipients  (inheritance  related  support 
ratio). This paper retains all those modifications and in the context of endogenous 
labour supply models variation in leisure demands by age in the same manner as 
consumption demand.  
 
Khan (2006) extended the Miles (1999) model which builds up on AK(1987) to model 
the aforementioned features. The extensions made were (i) accounting for children, 
(ii) extended planning horizon, and (iii) allowing individuals to die anywhere along 
the lifecycle as in actual data (and leave bequests, intentionally or unintentionally).  
 
Like Khan (2006), this paper uses actual primary data on demographics organized by 
age, historical and projected. In the actual data on demographics the maximum age of 
an individual may exceed 100. A representative individual in the model is therefore 
assumed  to  live  up  to  a  maximum  of  101  years,  17  as  young  non-working  child 
(determined through simulations), 48 as working adult and 36 as retired pensioner. 
Like the actual data on demographics, the individual may die anywhere along the 
lifecycle. In AK (1987) individuals live till the age of 75 whereas in Miles (1999) they 
live for 60 adult years.  
 
On the applied side, an important feature of the paper, like Khan (2006), is that the 
extended model is parameterized such that the optimal response of the simulations 
emulates  important  cross-sectional  (1997)  and  time  series  (1990  to  2003) 
fundamentals of the Australian economy (see the section on simulations for detail)
1.  
Table 1: The Extent of Ageing under Alternative Assumptions on Fertility 
The population of people aged 65 






2003  2032  2049 
Base 
Case 
1.75 from 1999 
onwards  12.43  20.08  22.2 
TFR1.65  declines from 1.75 
to 1.65 in 2004  12.5  20.5  23.06 
TFR1.3  declines from 1.75 
to 1.30 in 2009 
12.53  20.95  26.13 
                                                
 
1 The word “optimal” here is not used in the context of social planner like GM (2001). It refers to the 




Note: (i) For all these projections, life expectancy increases by 0.4 years 
every five years and annual net migration is 0.54 % of the total population. 
(ii) The first year of projection is 1999  
 
   
 
The rest of the paper is organized in the flowing manner. Section-2 gives a detailed 
description,  solution  and  interpretation  of  the  model.  Section  3  outline  general 
equilibrium solution of the model and describes the algorithm used to solve the model 
in general equilibrium. Section 4 simulates the model for the Australian Economy. 
This section outlines the way different preference and technology parameters are fixed 
and report the results of the simulations. Section 5 discuses whether the bequests 
generated by the model are joy-of-giving or accidental. Section 6 compare the base 
case model of the paper with alternative specification where lifetime uncertainty is 
explicitly model. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.   
 
2.  The Model 
The model comprises four sectors; a household sector, a single production sector, a 
government sector, and an international trade sector. Whereas households maximize 
discounted  sum  of  their  lifetime  utility  subject  to  lifetime  budget  constraint; 
production sector is assumed to maximize its profits. Government is assumed to run 
balance budget and is committed to a pure pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme. 
International trade sector allows locals and foreigners to hold each other’s assets as 
well as trade in output. Jointly these four sectors determine the economy’s dynamic 
equilibrium path.  
 
The model in this paper is a multi-period over lapping generations model where a 
representative individual is assumed to live for 101 years (101 is the maximum age in 
data on demographics) and allow for (i) young and old age dependencies, (ii) a hump-
shape age-productivity profile, (iii) age-varying consumption and leisure demands, 
and (iii) intentional and unintentional intergenerational transfers.   
 
To model the young age dependency, it is assumed that individuals do not work when 
they are children, 0 to TC (=16 which is determined through simulations) years of age, 
and their consumption is chosen and financed by their parents. On entering the labour 
market in the age of 18, individuals work full time till they retire at the age of 65. To 
model old-age dependency, it is assumed that the retired individuals, aged 65 and 
above, receive certain amount of state pension that is financed through tax collected 
from working population in that period (PAYG system).  
 
The age productivity relationship is modelled using Miles (1999) formula where log 
of the age-specific labour productivity is given by: 
 
2 0.05 - 0.0006   age age         (2.1) 
    
In the absence of time related rise in productivity, market value of the endowment 
peaks at the age of 42. With a total factor productivity growth rate of 1%, the actual 
for Australia (GM 2001), the time related rise in labour productivity (equal to the 
average long run rise in output per head) turns out to be 1.5%. The market value of the 
endowment with the 1.5% time related rise in labour productivity peaks at the age of 




Following CPSS (1990), Guest and McDonald (2001) and Khan (2006), individuals 
are assumed to have age-varying consumption demands. Technically speaking, this 
means that a unit of consumption is not as efficient in delivering satisfaction to an old 
person as it is in delivering satisfaction to a young. The idea is extended to leisure as 
well. It is assumed that leisure demand of individuals change with age as well and a 
unit of leisure is not as efficient in delivering satisfaction to an old person as it is to a 
young. This is captured through making utility a function of consumption and leisure 
demands.   
 
The model outlined in this paper allows people to leave bequests to later generations. 
By nature, these bequests are either optimally chosen (intentional) along with lifetime 
consumption  and  leisure  or  accidental  (unintentional).  Intentional  bequests  are  a 
manifestation of joy of giving which is also referred to as bequests as consumption 




The  idea  of  accidental  bequests  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that,  in  historical  and 
projected data on demographics, not all individuals survive to the fully anticipated 
lifetime.  Those  who  die  prematurely  (referred  to  as  accidental  deaths)  may  leave 
behind some wealth, negative or positive, referred to as accidental bequests. It is 
assumed  that  every  agent  in  the  economy  knows  with  certainty  the  number  of 
accidental  deaths in each age-group  and the amount of  wealth they leave  behind, 
negative  or  positive.  Although,  individuals  know  with  certainty  how  many  of  the 
agents in each age group will die, they however are not sure about who exactly those 
agents  will be and, therefore, in planning lifetime consumption totally ignore,  for 
convenience, the possibility of their own premature deaths. Individuals therefore plan 
for T adult periods, where T(=100-TC) is the maximum possible planning horizon on 
entering the labour force.  
   
In the base case model we ignore explicit incorporation of heterogeneity by planning 
horizon and lifetime uncertainty. Later in the paper, I discuss the implication of such 
modification in the model. It is shown that that, under conditions, acknowledging the 
existence of individuals with heterogeneous planning horizon will not change results 
of the model. Similarly, it is analytically shown that due to the calibration/simulation 
strategy adopted in this paper incorporating lifetime uncertainty in the model will give 
exactly the same result as the base case model irrespective of whether or not there are 
perfect  or  imperfect  annuity  markets.  This  is  because  the  calibration/simulation 
strategy automatically accounts for lifetime uncertainty. 
 
   
Let us now explain each sector of the model in detail.  
 
2.1  Household Sector:   
                                                
 
2 Theoretically speaking, part of these unintentional accidental bequests may be intentional joy-of-
giving bequests planed to be transferred at the end of life. However, what makes it accidental is the fact 
that individuals were planning to transfer it at the end of the full planning horizon but due to their pre-
mature death are transferred accidentally before time.  
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This  section  describes  behaviour  of  the  households;  their  preferences,  budget 
constraint, and their decision making processes. 
 
2.1.1  Household’s Preferences 
Households  in this model choose  their lifetime consumption and leisure along 
with consumption of their children and joy-of-giving bequests on the basis of their 
lifetime resources. It is assumed that individuals derive utility from  their own 
consumption  as  well  as  spending  on  their  children,  leisure  and  joy-of-giving 
bequests.  They  optimally  choose  these  values  subject  to  their  lifetime  budget 
constraint. 
 
I assume that in the beginning of lifecycle individuals do not work from 0 to TC 
(TC+1 periods); enter labour force after TC+1 years and work till they retire when 
they turn 65 (TC+1 to 64 for 64-TC years); and remain as retired state pensioners 
till they live to a maximum of 101 years from 65 to 100 (36 years).  
 
Following Miles (1999), for the sake of convenience, through out this paper I 
index generations by the year they enter the labour force. In general i represents 
the time a particular generation, referred to as generation i, enters its adulthood or 
joins  the  labour  force.  τ  represents  time.  Thus  at  a  given  point  in  time,  τ,  a 
representative agent in generation i is (TC+1)+(τ-i)+1 years of age with (TC+1) 
years  spent  as  nonworking  child  and  (τ-i)+1  as  working  adult.  For  a  quick 
reference, this is depicted in Figure 1. 




In light of the above discussion, the lifetime utility function of a representative 
agent in a generation i is assumed to take the following functional form
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where T(=100-TC) is length of the planning horizon on entering the labour force 
and Tw(=64-TC) is the number of periods an individual stays in the labour force. 

























h h h g
-




            -         +
  
=   
   
 is the instantaneous utility function 
                                                
 
3 The superscript “c” stands for “children”  
 
7 
of a representative agent, where  
, 0 1
i l
t £ £  is proportion of the available time 
allocated to work,( ) , 1
i l
t -  is the proportion of time allocated to leisure;  , i c τ is the 
consumption  of  a  representative  agent  in  generation  i  at  time  τ,  , i p t   the  age 
specific consumption efficiency weights of the agent when in (τ-i+1)th year of 








   
 
is therefore consumption 
measured  in efficiency  units  also  referred to  as  consumption  per  consumption 
units and living standards; 
, i g
t , an equivalent of 
, i p
t  for leisure, is referred to as 
leisure efficiency weights of the agent when in (τ-i+1)th year of his/her working 
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, where  ,
c
i c t  consumption of his/her  ,
c
i n t  children 
(population of children divided by working population), and  ,
c
i x t  the number of 
children  measured  in  consumption  units  (weighted  by  their  consumption 
efficiency weights)




























     
=    
-    
, where  i n  the number of bequestees per donor (total 
number  of  working  population  relative  to  old  generation)  and  i b   the  size  of 
bequest made by a representative agent in generation i at the end of his/her life to 
later generations (the working population only). 
 
1 i t j + - is the weight assigned to the utility parents derive from spending on their 
children when they (parents) are in  ( ) 1 i t - + ’th year of their working life.  ρ is 
the  rate  of  time  preference,  ξ   the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  of 
consumption  as  well  as  leisure,  g   quantifies  the  preference  of  leisure  over 
consumption,  h   determines  the  substitutability  of  consumption  and  leisure 
respectively, and ω  the weight placed on joy-of-giving bequest. 
 
2.1.2  Household’s Budget Constraint:   
The  household’s  lifetime  resources  come  from  three  sources;  labour 
income,  state  pension,  and  shares  in  bequest  from  previous  generations, 
generations  that  die  when  the  agent  is  part  of  the  labour  force.  The  budget 
constraint for a representative agent in generation i is 
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i V  is the notional stock of wealth at the end of life available for enjoyment in the 
form of consumption, leisure, spending on children and bequest. In the literature, 
this is referred to as “full-income”. 
 
Important aspects of this constraint are outlined as follows. 
 
i.  Labour Income:  , i h t   the  age-specific  endowment  of  effective  units  of 
labour available to each member of generation i at timet (determined by the 
Miles (1999) formula stated above),  t w  is the real wage rate that grows at the 
rate of total factor productivity and  , i l t the proportion of time spent working. 
, , i i w l h t t t  is therefore the labour income of a representative agent in generation i 
at  time  t .  t τ   is  the  PAYG  tax  rate.  ( ) , , 1 t i i w l h τ τ τ τ −   is  therefore  the 
corresponding disposable labour income. The first term on left hand side of the 
budget  constraint  is  present  value  of  the  disposable  labour  income  over  the 
working life.  
 
ii.  State Pension:  ￿ , i PN τ is the state pension received by a representative 
agent in generation i  in period  t . This  income is  positive only  after agents 
retire, in old age, otherwise zero.  The  third  on  the  left  hand  side  of  the 
budget constraint is therefore present value of pension stream received by the 
representative agent over retirement.   
 
Pension benefits,  ￿ , i PN τ, in the model are calculated at an exogenously given 
replacement rate. Replacement rate, rept, is the average pension as proportion of 






















































rep     (2.3) 
Recall  that  government  is  committed  to  PAYG  pension  scheme  and  runs  a 
balanced budget. The government budget constraint can be written as 
 
iii.  PAYG tax rate and old age dependency:   tt  is the tax rate levied on any 
labour income at time τ. Like Miles (1999), for a given replacement rate the tax 
rate  on  labour  income  in  each  period  (tt )  is  set so  as  to  balance aggregate 
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or  
tτ × (working pop)×(avg labour income) = (retired pop)×(avg pension)  (2.4)  
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where the left hand side is the tax revenue collected from imposing tax at the 
rate  tt  on labour income of the working population, and the right side is the 
aggregate pension paid to the retired individuals.  
 
From equation (2.3) and (2.4) 



































t   (2.5)   
Thus, a one percent increase in the proportion of retired population relative to 
the working population will increase PAYG tax rate by the replacement rate.  
 
Since working population has to finance the pension paid to retired population, 
this PAYG tax rate captures the old-age dependency aspect of ageing. 
 
Note that the equilibrium rate of PAYG tax rate is independent of labour income 
(hence  labour  supply).  Thus,  tax  rates  will  remain  the  same  irrespective  of 
whether labour supply is exogenous or endogenous. The intuition behind this 
result is this. Whereas, on one hand, an endogenous decline in labour supply 
decreases average labour income which puts upwards pressure on the PAYG tax 
rates, on  the  other  hand, the decline in average labour income  reduces  state 
pension  at  a  given  replacement  rate  (equation  (2.3))  which  puts  downward 
pressure on the PAYG tax rate. In equilibrium these two effects cancel each 
other out.  
 
iv.  Share in bequests received from previous generations:  Because the model 
assumes that in each period one generation dies and another newly born takes its 
place and that some agents in each generation die prematurely, in each period 
individuals receive bequests from those died in the last period of their life or 
prematurely. The paper assumes that individuals are entitled to receive bequests 
only when they are in the working force and that these bequests are equally 
shared by the working population.   
 
, i b t   denotes  the  share  of  bequests  received  by  a  representative  agent  in 
generation i at time t  from agents who died in the last period, bequeathed as joy 
of giving, and  ,
a
i b t  the share in bequests from agents who died prematurely as 
accidental bequests. The superscript “a” stands for accidental.   
 
I assume that these bequests are made at the end of each period and are received 
by the beneficiaries in start of the next period








− = +  where  1 bτ−  
is the bequest left by a representative agent in generation τ-T dying in period τ-1, 
and nτis the number of working children in period τ-1 alive in period τ
6. 
                                                
 
5 Think of this as a contract written in favour of an individual in the working population entitling 
him/her to receive his/her share after the older generation passes away.  
6 As the bequests made are received with a year lag, they earn marginal product net of depreciation that 






i b t  is the share in bequests received from those died prematurely. 
This value is obtained by summing the products of the number of agents in 
different age groups who die in each period and the wealth each one of them 
leaves behind, and dividing it by the number of agents sharing it. i.e.  

























  (2.6) 
Later in production sector of the model I assume that all of the household wealth 
in each period is used to build up domestic capital or acquire foreign assets, 
these bequest shares therefore are in the form of ownership of assets. Individuals 
can trade these assets in local or international markets if they decide to consume, 
all or part of, it.  
 
The second term on the left hand side is therefore present value of the shares in 
bequest, joy of giving or accidental, received by the representative agent over 
the lifecycle. 
 
v.  Young-age (childhood) dependency:   
As mentioned earlier, individuals spend  ,
c
i c t , which is optimally chosen, dollars 
on  the  consumption  of  their  ,
c
i n t   children.  The  model  considers  children  as 
responsibility of the working population in the society and thus calculates  ,
c
i n t  as 
ratio  of  the  population  of  children  in  a  particular  period  to  the  size  of  the 
working  population  in  that  period.  Individuals  therefore  spend  on  children 
through out their working life. This approach is in line with the fact that in some 
countries, like Australia, government provides for some of the consumption of 
the  children  which  is  financed  through  taxation.  Here  I  do  not  involve 
government  and  let  the  parents  choose  the  spending  optimally.  Part  of  the 
spending not financed through government taxation can be thought of as inter-
vivos transfers to their children. 
 
This is unlike AK (1987) where children are born when parents are 21 years of 
age. Parents optimally choose consumption of their children until their children 
turn 21. That is when their parents are 40. Parents do not spend on their children 
when they are older than 40 years. Another difference is that children in the 
model in this paper don’t work whereas in AK (1987), children work as well. 
 
The last two terms on the left side of the budget constraint represent present value of 
the individual’s own and his children’s lifetime consumption. Notice that individuals 
take care of their children only when they are working, implying that children are the 
responsibility of the working population only. 
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i V  is the notional stock of wealth at the end of life available for enjoyment in the form 
of consumption, leisure, spending on children and bequest. In the literature, this is 
referred to as “full-income”. The second term is present value of the leisure consumed 
over the lifetime. The remaining terms bear the same interpretation as before.  
 
2.1.3.  Solution of the Model: 
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= and bi. The first order conditions result in the following 
key relationships between consumption, leisure, spending on children, and bequests.  
For t  = i,........,i+(Tw-1)   
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For   t  = i,...,i+(T-1),     
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Equations (2.8) and (2.10) together with the budget constraint gives the optimal joy of 
giving bequests,  i b , which is  
   
￿
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b V                     (2.11) 
Similarly, we can derive 
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Adding (2.12) and (2.13) we get  
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￿i V  is the notional  stock of  full-wealth, or  full lifetime-income, at the end  of  life 
available  for  consumption  in  the  form  of  own  consumption,  leisure,  spending  on 
children, and bequests over the lifecycle. Following Khan (2006) we can show that 
the denominator of the right hand side of equations (2.15) to (2.16),  ∇i, measure of 
the  lifecycle family  over  the  planning  horizon (referred  to as  utility  worth  of the 
effective lifecycle family) and the numerator in equation (2.14) is argued to be size of 
the family at a given point in time over the lifecycle (referred to as utility worth of the 
size of the instantaneous family). 
 
To show this let us first give an interpretation to  τ , i M . Let  ξ η = = 1,  τ τ = = , , 1 i i p g   ∀ 
τs, r=ρ=0, and  1 γ = . Imposing these restrictions, the value of  τ , i M  before retirement is 
equal to 2. The imposed restrictions make leisure and consumption equally desirable 
and since individuals consume both at a given point in time, the effective size of the 
representative agent in terms of consumption goods equals 2. I refer to this as effective 
size of the representative agent
7.   
 
Imposing these restrictions together with  1 ϕ ω = =  reduces equations (2.11) to (2.14) 








+ − + −
= =+
=






















+ − + −
= =+
=

























+ − + −
= =+
=














































   







+ − + −
= = +









n n . The first term is the number of bequestees per 
donor. The second and third term is the effective size of the household during the 
working period and retirement respectively. The whole term is therefore effective 
size of the family over the lifecycle, referred to as effective size of the lifecycle 
family.  
 
Now consider numerators in the above equations.  i n  is the number of bequestees 
per donor at the end of life. Thus, the optimal value of bequests relative to the full 
lifetime-income  available  for  enjoyment  is  determined  by  the  number  of 
bequestees relative to the effective lifecycle family. Similarly, consumption of the 
                                                
 
7 It turns out that under similar restriction n number of choice variables in the utility function would 
give an effective size of the representative agent equal to n.  
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representative agent relative to the full lifetime income at a given point in time 
over the lifecycle is determined by size of the agent (=1) relative to the effective 
size of the lifecycle family, and that of children by their number ( τ ,
c
i n ) relative to 
the effective size of the lifecycle family. From perspective of a family as a whole, 
the consumption enjoyed by the family at a given point in time ( τ τ + , ,
c
i i c c ) relative 
to  the  full  lifetime  income  is  determined  by  size  of  the  instantaneous  family 
( ) τ + , 1 c
i n  relative to the effective size of the lifecycle family.  
 
Thus consumption of an agent (family) at a given point in time is determined by 
utility worth of the size of the agent (family) at the point relative to the utility 
worth of the effective size of the lifecycle family.  
 
 
2.2  Production Sector:   
The model is characterized by a single production sector behaving competitively. 
The sector is assumed to use capital and labour as inputs subject to Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Capital is assumed to be homogeneous and depreciating at a 
rate equal tod
8. The production function is given by    
    α α
τ τ τ τ
− = 1 Q A K L                    (2.17) 
Qτ is aggregate output of the economy,Lτ is the aggregate employment level, and 
Kτ   the  aggregate  capital  stock  used  in  domestic  production.  
Competitive nature of the production sector requires all factors of production to be 
paid according to their marginal productivity.  τ A  is technology that grows at the rate 
“a”( ( )τ
τ = + 0 1 A A a ). Thus  
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                    (2.19)
By the overlapping generation nature of the model, aggregate employment is the 
sum of labour hours supplied by the working population in the economy i.e.  
 
( ) ( )
, , , ,
1 1 w w
i i i i
i T i T
L L N l h
τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ = − − = − −
= = ∑ ∑                   
(2.20) 
Domestic capital stock comes from aggregate household wealth ( t W ) net of foreign 
assets holdings ( t F ) .So,  1 K W F τ τ τ − = − , where the total wealth is the sum of 
individuals’ wealth in the economy, given by   
 
( ) ( )
, , ,
1 1 w w
i i i
T T
W W N w
τ τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ − − − −
= = ∑ ∑                   (2.21)
  ( ) ￿ ( ) τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ− = − + + + − − + + , , , , , , , , 1 1 1 a c
i i i i i i i i w t y b b PN c c r w             (2.22) 
 
2.3  International Trade Sector:  
The international trade sector allows trade in assets and trade in final goods. Thus at 
any point in time a household’s wealth is in the form of domestic assets (Kτ ) and, 
or, foreign assets (Fτ), net foreign assets in broad terms. Because, return on assets 
                                                
 
8 Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) assume capital to be nondepreciating.  
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across countries is the same and that they are perfectly mobile and equally tradeable, 
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes. 
 
Apart from trade in assets, the model acknowledges trade in final output as well. 
The  intuition  is  that  simply  allowing  for  capital  inflow  or  outflow  induced  by 
interest  rate  differential  doesn’t  necessarily  imply  a  production  level  matching 
consumption demands in that period. Assuming that the single production sector 
produce  consumption  goods  as  well  as  domestic  capital  goods,  the  difference 
between  total  production  (Qτ)  and  the  sum  of  consumption  and  investment  in 
domestic capital equals net-export i.e.   
    NX Q C I τ τ τ τ = − −                               (2.23) 
 
2.4  Government Sector:   
In  the  present  version  of  the  model  government  plays  a  very  limited  role. 
Government simply supplies a government pension to people in the old period of 
their lives. Tax is collected to balance the government budget in each period. Thus 
the government pension is a PAYG scheme.  
 
3.  General Equilibrium Solution of the Model:    
There are three issues that need attention in obtaining a general equilibrium solution 
to the model: the starting-values problem, calculating the optimal values of accidental 
bequests, and the end-values problem. These issues are addressed in the same manner 
as discussed in Khan (2006).  
 
Although general equilibrium properties of the model with endogenous labour supply 
are similar to those of a model with exogenous labour supply (which was described in 
Khan (2006)), the algorithm described in Khan (2006) needs a slight modification to 
get a general equilibrium solution to the extended model. The modified algorithm is 
briefly described below.  
 
Previously, in Khan (2006), labour income was exogenously given, so PAYG pension 
was calculated exogenously at a given replacement rate. However, with endogenous 
labour supply this no longer holds. For labour income equals  τ τ τ , , i i w l h , I can either 
make a guess at  τ , i l ∀ i and τ, the proportion of time allocated to paid work (both  t w  
and  , i t h )
9, calculate the PAYG pension at the exogenously given replacement rate, 
revise the guesses until it matches the actuals; or, guess the PAYG pension and revise 
it until they match the actual ones. The second option is more straight forward and 
easy to implement than the first. So, I proceed with that one. 
 
A guess at the PAYG pension and accidental bequests is used to calculate optimal 
consumption, spending on children, the proportion of time spent working, optimal 
joy-of-giving bequests and the share received by each bequestee, and the saving and 
wealth profile of each representative agent in each generation. The resulting wealth 
profiles  over  the  lifecycle  are  used  to  calculate  the  share  in  accidental  bequests 
received by each representative agent, which is obtained by multiplying the number of 
                                                
 
9  t w  has time related productivity component,  t A , and needs a starting value. Here I assume the 
starting value of   0 A  is given. Later part of the paper explains the criterion used to fix  0 A .  
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accidental deaths in each age group by their respective wealth and dividing by the 
number of bequestees.  
 
Similarly, after getting estimates of the proportion of total available time allocated to 
work, I calculate the income from labour and calculate the actual PAYG pension at 
the given replacement rate. Guesses at the PAYG pension and accidental bequests are 
updated until they match the actuals. 
 
As the model is that of a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, r is fixed 









1 A K L
r
,  and  investment  in  the  economy.  Also,  I  can  calculate 
lending (borrowing from) abroad using  1 F W K τ τ τ − = −  and optimal current account 
balance  as  1 CAB F F τ τ τ− = − .  A  series  of  optimal  national  saving  is  obtained  by 
adding current account balance with investment. This process is depicted in Figure 4.
   
 
4.  The Simulations: 
4.1  Fixing Values of the Parameters and Some Exogenous Variables 
In  general,  the  model  is  calibrated  such  that  optimal  response  of  the  simulation 
mimics important cross-section (1997) and time series (1990 to 2003) fundamentals of 
the  Australian  economy.  Some  of  the  parameters  are  exogenously  set  and  other 
determined  such  that  the  following  targets,  which  are  representative  of  the  cross-
section and time series fundamentals, are achieved,  
(i)  the optimal distribution of consumption by age in 1997 closely follow the 
actual for Australia in that period,  
(ii)  the  optimal  value  of  capital  output  ratio  approximates  the  actual  for 
Australia in period 1990 to 2003, and 
(iii)  aggregate bequests as percentage of GDP in year 2000 stay close to the 
empirical estimates for the US economy, 
(iv)  the optimal value of GDP in year 2000 equals the actual for Australia, 
(v)  optimal  national  saving,  investment,  and  current  account  balance  as 
percentage of GDP during 1990 to 2003 mimic the actual for Australia, 
(vi)  the  optimal  gap  between  gross  national  saving  and  net  national  saving 
emulates the actual for Australia during 1990 to 2003.  
(vii)  the average number of hours worked per week in year 2000 equals 40. 
 
The  consumption  efficiency  weights  over  the  lifecycle  ( , i p τ )  and  production 
possibilities  ( ,0 i h ),  before  1997,  are  fixed  such  that  the  optimal  distribution  of 
consumption by age in 1997 approximates the actual distribution of consumption by 
age  in that period
10.  This is  done in the base case model  where labour supply  is 
                                                
 
10 Initially, at given ,0 i h , simulations were carried out to fix  , i p τ ’s aiming at getting the 
distribution  of  consumption  by  age  in  1997  closest  to  the  actual  in  that  period.  
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exogenous. Figure 5 plots the actual and resulted optimal distribution of consumption 
by age in 1997. Figure 6 plots the consumption efficiency weights associated with the 
age distribution of consumption by age (as depicted in Figure 5). Leisure units per 
person are set equal to the consumption units per person. i.e. , , i i p g τ τ = .  
 
Following Miles (1999), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ξ, is set at 0.75 
and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, h , is 
fixed at 0.8. Following Khan (2006), TC is set equal to 16, and the weight placed on 
utility from spending on children (ϕ) fixed at 0.85. Both Tc and ϕ were determined 
through simulations by Khan (2006).  
 
The weight placed on utility from bequests (ω) is set such that aggregate bequests as a 
percentage of GDP stays as close to similar empirical estimates in the US, since there 
is no reasonable range for Australia so far, which ranges from 1.5 to 2.65 % of GDP 
as estimated by Lutz 2002.  w determines the level and evolution of an individual’s 
wealth over the lifecycle.  As  w goes down, wealth at each point in time for  all 
generations decreases and,  for exogenously  given  accidental  deaths, the aggregate 
wealth transferred to bequestees goes down. Since the model tend to generate huge 
bequests, for an empirically plausible wealth profile, a non-negative value of ω that 
ensures aggregate bequests as a percentage of GDP closer to the empirical range of 
1.5-2.65% is zero.  
 
It is also worth noting that as  w approaches zero, aggregate bequests approach its 
minimum value. Estimates of bequests in the model should therefore be seen as a 
lower bound on the aggregate bequests. 
 
Total factor productivity growth rate “a” is set equal to 1% per annum (following GM 
(2001) and Khan (2006)).  0 A  (the starting value of the total factor productivity), γ (the 
parameter quantifying the importance of leisure relative to consumption), r (the word 
rate of interest),  δ (the rate of depreciation), and ρ (the time rate of preference) are 
determined  through  simulations  such  that  the  targets  mentioned  before  are 
simultaneously achieved. Changes in any of these parameters affect all the variables 
mentioned in the targets except the capital-output ratio which is determined by r and 
δ (at  given  value  of  α,  as  I  shall  see)  only.  In  the  following  I  explain  the 
criterion/criteria used to fix each one of these parameters.  
 
With total factor productivity growth rate equal to “a”, ( ) 0 1 A A a
τ
τ = + , A0 is fixed such 
that the optimal level of GDP in year 2000 equals the actual for Australia in that 
period.  
 
γ, the parameter quantifying importance of  leisure relative to consumption, is fixed 
such that average number of hours worked in year 2000 turns out to be 40 per week. 
As pointed out by Miles (1999), assuming 16 hours a day available to be distributed 
between leisure and work (8 hours spent asleep), gives a total endowment of 5,840 
                                                                                                                                       
 
Further matching of the distribution was obtained by changing  ,0 i h . The simulations, 
for example, reveal that the production possibilities before Second World War were 
at the most 40% higher than those after the Second World War.     
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hours in a given year. With a typical working year of 48 weeks, an average level of li,τ 
equal to 0.33 leads to an average working week of 40 hours
11. Off course some of the 
individuals, in their middle age, will work more and other, other than middle age 
(young and old), less such that the average is 40 hours a week.  
 
Since the gap between gross national saving and net national saving is driven by the 
rate of depreciation,  δ  is again, like Khan (2006) chosen such that the optimal gap 
between  gross  national  and  net  national  saving  (gross  national  saving  net  of 
depreciation) as percent of GDP closely follow the 1990-2003 actual for Australia 
during that period.  
 
Like  the  exogenous  labour  supply  model,  in  a  small  open  economy  with  Cobb 
Douglas production function and perfect capital mobility, the optimal capital output 
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  where  Lτ   is  determined.  As  clear,  the 
capital-output ratio is determined by the exogenously set  α, (the share of capital in 
output =1/3),  the rate of depreciation  δ  (fixed as discussed above) and the rate of 
interest r. Similarly, the optimal rate of investment depends upon  α, r,  δ , the rate of 
TFP growth “a” which is exogenously fixed at its actual value =1% per annum for 
Australia, and the growth of labour supply which is endogenously determined.  Lτ  and 
its growth depends upon the size of the working population as well as the proportion 
of time spent working which is affected by all the parameters in the model. Thus, I fix 
the world rate of interest (r) at the exogenously given values of α, a, ξ, h , and TC; A0 
, γ, and  δ  conforming to the criteria outlined earlier; and a given ρ (the time rate of 
preference, to be discussed), such that optimal investment as percentage of GDP in 
period 1990 to 2003 mimics the actual for Australia and at the same time the optimal 
capital output ratio approximately equals the actual for Australia. 
 
The above exercise is repeated at each value of ρ, the time rate of preference, until 
optimal saving as percentage of GDP emulates the actual for Australia during the 
period 1990 to 2003. Since the rate of depreciation is chosen such that the optimal gap 
between gross national saving and net national saving approximate the actual gap 
during 1990 to 2003, optimal net national saving as % of GDP during this period also 
mimic the actual rate of net national saving in Australia.  
 
The resulted values of the parameters are summarized in  
Table 2. 
 
4.2.  Simulation Results 
Figure 5  to Figure  16  depict  results of  the  simulations calibrated for Australia in 
manner outlined above.  
 
                                                
 
11 This is unlike Miles 1999 who fixes γ such that average over the life cycle is 40 hours per week.   
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As stated earlier, the age specific consumption units per person over the lifecycle,  , i p τ , 
are, along with the rest of the parameters, set such that the optimal distribution of 
consumption by age in 1997 mimic the actual for Australia in that period. Figure 6 
reports  the  consumption  units  profile  and  Figure  5  the  corresponding  actual  and 
optimal distribution of consumption by age generated by the simulations. Figure 7 
depicts  the  actual  and  optimal  series  of  optimal  national  saving,  investment,  net 
national saving and current account balance as percentage of GDP. 
 
Figure 8 reports the pay-as-you-go tax rate required to finance the state pension at 
26% replacement rate. Starting at 5% of the labour income in 2003 it reaches 9.8% in 
2050. In the next 50 years after 2050, it is projected to increase by just 1.6 percentage 
points and reach 11.4% in year 2100.  
 
Aggregate bequests as percentage of GDP in year 1990, in the endogenous labour 
model, are half a percentage point above the upper bound of the empirical estimates 
derived by Lutz (2002) for the US economy and less than half a percentage point 
below the estimates derived by Auerbach et al. (1999). However, when labour supply 
is exogenous, optimal aggregate bequests as percentage of GDP in 1990 are less than 
0.5 (1.5) percentage points above the estimates arrived at by Auerbach et al (Lutz) for 
the US economy. 
 
Figure 9 reports estimates of the aggregate bequests as a percentage of GDP when 
labour  supply  is  exogenous.  It  is  projected  that  by  2017  aggregate  bequests  as  a 
percentage of GDP is projected to decline by 1 percentage point from its initial value 
of 4.5% of GDP in the year 2000. This decline is due to decline in the number of 
accidental deaths per bequestee. From there onwards bequests as a percentage of GDP 
start increasing sharply and by 2030, they are projected to increase by more than 2.1 
percentage points. In the next 20 years after that, bequests as a percentage of GDP are 
projected to increases by up to 1.9 percentage points relative to the 2030 level. This 
indicates the importance of bequests as the economy ages.  
 
Like the exogenous labour supply case, aggregate bequests as percentage of GDP are 
projected to go down (although by a slower pace than in the exogenous labour supply 
model) in the coming decade and reach a minimum of 3.1(Figure 10). As mentioned 
earlier, this initial decline is due to decline in the number of accidental deaths per 
bequestee. By 2030, bequests as percentage of GDP are projected to increase from its 
minimum  value  by  1.8  percentage  points  when  labour  supply  is  endogenous  (as 
compared to the 2.1 percentage points when labour supply is exogenous). In the next 
20 years after that, bequests as percentage of GDP are projected to increases by up to 
1.2 percentage points relative to its 2030 value.  
 
A model with endogenous supply predicts lowers accidental bequests as percentage of 
GDP. Starting at 1% below the value obtained from a model with exogenous labour 
supply, the gap narrows down slowly to 0.4 percentage points by late 2010s and starts 
increasing from there onwards and reaches a difference of 1.4 (3) percentage point by 
2050  (2100).  This  discrepancy  almost  disappears  as  the  intertemporal  elasticity 
approaches the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. i.e.  η→ξ (=0.75). Intuitively, 
the nearer  η to ξ the higher is the consumption after retirement, the more wealth 
consumers need to accumulate to finance future consumption. The same number of  
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accidental  death with higher  values of  wealth therefore  leads to higher accidental 
bequests.  
 
Drop in total fertility rate indicates increase in aggregate bequests as percentage of 
GDP as indicated by Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
 
Figure 13 plots the distribution of  bequests by age in selected years as % of GDP. As 
argued earlier, most of the bequests are left by the retired population, those 65 and 
above.  Also  notice  that  generations  in  the  first  half  of  their  working  lives  leave 
behind negative bequests which are observed in actual data as well (Lutz (2002)). 
 
Can Inheritances Alleviate the Fiscal Burden of an Ageing Population? 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 depict the PAYG tax rate and the aggregate bequest as a 
percentage  of  GDP  in  the  exogenous  and  endogenous  labour  supply  cases 
respectively. These figures give a quick idea of the ability of the intergenerational 
transfers to alleviate fiscal burden. As is obvious, like the fiscal burden, inheritances 
as  a  percentage  of  GDP  are  also  projected  to  increase  sharply  over  the  coming 
decades. In the exogenous labour supply case, these inheritances increase at a rate 
faster than the PAYG tax rate, after initially declining slightly for a decade and a half 
since 2000. In the model with endogenous labour supply, bequests do not increase as 
fast as in the exogenous labour supply case, but slightly faster than the PAYG tax rate, 
after dropping slightly initially like the exogenous labour supply case
12.  
 
In order to have an idea of the exact proportion of the fiscal burden alleviated by these 
bequests from each generation, Figure 14 and Figure 15 plot the present value of 
bequests received by individuals as a percentage of the present value of taxes paid by 











































). Thus, the value on the vertical axis measures the extent to 
which the burden of taxes is offset by bequest transfers. A value of 100 on the vertical 
axis at 2000 on the horizontal axis means that 100% of the fiscal burden faced by 
generation 2000 is alleviated by the bequests that the generation receive. 
 
These results reveal that intergenerational transfers in the model offset most of the 
fiscal  burden.  Up  to  generation  2010  the  taxes  paid  by  each  generation  over  the 
working life increase faster than the bequests received. As a result the present value of 
bequests as a percentage of taxes goes down, hence its compensating ability. From 
generation  2010  onwards,  the  present  value  of  the  stream  of  shares  in  bequests 
received by each generation increases faster than the present value of the stream of 
taxes they pay, which results in a greater compensation of the fiscal burden. In the 
model with endogenous labour supply, about 87 % of the tax burden of generation 
                                                
 
12 This is probably one of the reasons why we see almost no rotations or shift in the saving profiles 
when labour supply is exogenous as compared to when it is endogenous. In the first case almost the 
entire burden of taxation is alleviated by inheritances whereas in the second it is relatively less.  
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2000 is compensated for by the inheritances the generation receive. The compensation 
goes down for the next 10 generations up to a maximum of 7 percentage points in the 
base case and starts increasing thereafter. Generation 2040 is expected to receive a 
bequests dividend that would offset slightly more than 90% of the tax burden that it 
pays. In the TFR1.65 population projection, inheritances are expected to offset up to 
95%  of the  tax  burden  of  generation  2045  onwards.  In  the  low  fertility  scenario, 
TFR1.3, the bequests are sufficient enough to totally outweigh the fiscal burden of the 
2020  generation  onwards.  These  estimates  are  even  larger  in  the  model  with  an 
exogenous labour supply. In the base case and TFR1.65, the entire fiscal burden of 
taxes is offset from the year 2025 onwards. Similarly, in the population projections 
with a total fertility rate of 1.3, TFR1.3, intergenerational transfers always cancel out 
and outweigh the tax payments. 
 
Good news as it sounds, these estimates are revised significantly when we investigate 












































). This seems more appropriate as consumption 
and leisure are proportional to the full lifetime income measured as a notional stock of 
full wealth at the end of lifetime. Figure 16 pots present value of bequests as % of the 
present  value  of  PAYG  taxes  (calculated  as  %  of  full-income)  by  generation. 
Generations born in year 2000 will receive amounting to 26 percent of their lifetime 
full  income  (as  compared  with  88%  of  the  simple  lifetime  labour  income). 
Generations born in the second decade of the 21
st century in Australia will suffer the 
most as they will be compensated 2.5 percentage point less that the 2000 generation. 
A significant drop in fertility will increase the compensating potential of these private 
intergenerational transfers of future generations.  
 
Calculation based on steady state simulations suggests that a bequest to GDP ratio of 
1% will offset about 33.3 % of the fiscal burden when measured as a % of simple 
labour income and 8.9% of the fiscal burden when measured as % of the full income. 
Conversely, a bequest to GDP ration of 3% (11.1%) will offset all of the fiscal burden 
measured a present value of the simple (full) labour-income over the lifecycle.  
 
5.  Bequests: Joy-of-giving or Accidental? 
In the paper I constructed an OLG model where individuals enter the labour force 
when they are 18 years of age. They work until they retire at the age of 65 and spend 
the rest of their lifetime, a maximum of 36 years, as retired pensioners. However, in 
the model, because I use actual demographic data, not all individuals survive to the 
fully anticipated life. They may die anywhere along the lifecycle. This raises concerns 
about the length of the planning horizon. To fully insure against any risk of longevity 
due  to  absence  of  annuity  markets,  the  model  presented  thus  far  assumes  that 
individuals plan for the fully anticipated lifetime, T=84 adult years. Thus, individuals 
are homogenous by planning horizon, even although they may die earlier anywhere 
along  the  lifecycle.  Deaths  before  the  fully  anticipated  life  were  referred  to  as 
accidental deaths. The bequest, negative or positive, left behind in such an event was 
described as accidental. To address the concern of who gets the accidental wealth, it  
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was  assumed  that  accidental  bequests  are  evenly  distributed  across  the  working 
population
13. For convenience, it was assumed that individuals know with certainty 
how many individuals in each age group will die and how much wealth, in the form of 
accidental bequests, they will receive. However, in planning their lifetime decisions, 
they totally ignore the possibility of their own premature death.  
 
Thus far individuals are homogenous by planning horizon (all of them expect to live 
and plan for T adult years even although they may die earlier). Let us refer to this as a 
model with homogenous agents. The bequests left at the end of the fully anticipated 
life are referred to as joy-of-giving bequests which are optimally chosen.  
 
As discussed, in the simulations I set  ω (the weight placed on optimal joy-of-giving 
bequests) equal to zero, implying zero optimal joy-of-giving bequest at the end of the 
fully anticipated planning horizon. With no bequests at the end of the fully anticipated 
life, at the outset, all bequests in the model with homogenous agents are accidental 
bequests.  
 
Kotlikoff (2001) lists a number of studies which suggests that most bequests may be 
unintended or motivated by non-altruistic considerations. These include, Boskin and 
Kotlikoff (1985), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992, 1997); Abel and Kotlikoff 
(1994), Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996); Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus 
(1996); Wilhelm (1996); and Hurd (1992). In response to the frequently observed 
positive saving of retired individuals, which might be an indication of joy-of-giving 
bequests motive, Kotlikoff (2001) argues that when wealth is calculated to include the 
capitalized value of social receipts, saving decreases through-out retirement. This is 
shown  in  studies  by  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff, and  Sabelhaus  (1996)  and  Miles  (1997). 
Furthermore, he adds, since on average the lifetime income of children significantly 
exceed those of their parents, anything less than strong altruism would not suffice to 
generate ubiquitous and significant bequests (Meade (1966) and Flemming (1976)). 
 
Davis (1981) also argues that “few, even among the old, say they are saving for 
bequests” based on the evidence from the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics in 
the US where only 4 percent of the respondents in the US cited “providing an estate” 
as saving objective (Projector and Weiss 1966, table A 30); and the 1964 Brooking 
Survey of affluent families (income above $10,000) where only 23% (of all ages) who 
were saving to make a bequests (Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan 1966 p.198). 
 
Despite of the evidence cited above that put some weight in favour of the nature of the 
bequests generated by the model with homogenous agents, it is worthwhile to mention 
and show that it is possible to cast the model in an alternative set up and interpret all, 
in loose terms, or some of the bequests as joy-of-giving.  
 
To show this, let us start with the assumption that individuals know with certainty 
their exact age, hence their exact planning horizon. Thus in each generation there are 
cohorts with different planning horizons, ranging from 1 to T years. This model is 
referred  to  as  a  model  with  heterogeneous  agents.  All  bequests  in  the  model  are 
                                                
 
13 Of course, a more accurate way would be to distribute the wealth between the biological offspring of 
the deceased. However, I do not have appropriate data to do so.   
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intentional joy-of-giving. This is another polar case and the actual situation may be 
somewhere  in-between  the  model  with  homogenous  agents  and  the  model  with 
heterogeneous agents (further commented on later).  
 
Although  I  abstract  away  from  any  such  exercise,  it  is  important  to  know  what 
proportion  of  the  bequests  is  intentional  joy-of-giving  and  what  proportion  is 
unintentional  accidental,  as  taxing  intentional  bequests  distorts  saving  behaviour, 
whereas  taxing  unintentional  bequests  does  not  (Laitner  2001,  Lutz  2002).  Lutz 
(2002)  concludes  that  at  least  half  and  perhaps  all  of  the  observed  bequests  are 
accidental.  
 
Let us now describe the model with heterogeneous agents and derive the condition(s) 
under which the  model with  heterogeneous agents will generate exactly the same 
results as the model with homogenous agents.  
 
Consider an OLG model where individuals know with certainty the length of their 
lives and planning horizon. Since different individuals die at different age along the 
lifecycle, in each generation there are T possible heterogeneous (by planning horizon) 
agents with planning horizons ranging from 1 to T. Thus, at a given point in time there 
are  T T ×  adult overlapping generations (plus the young generations). Since there are 
no  accidental  deaths  in  the  model  with  heterogeneous  agents,  all  bequests  are 
therefore intentional joy-of-giving bequests.  
 
To outline the model in more detail and derive the condition under which both the 
models generate the same bequest stream, let us consider a case where labour supply 
is endogenous. Since the model with exogenous labour supply is a special case of the 
model with endogenous labour supply, the alternative specification applies equally to 
the  model  with  exogenous  labour  supply.  Let  ￿
, i H V   denote  the  full  income  of  a 
representative agent in generation i as a notional stock of wealth at the year of death 
who lives for H adult periods (1≤H≤T is therefore length of the planning horizon),  , i H n  
the  number  of bequestees for those who die after H periods,  and  , i H w  the weight 
placed by a representative agent with H planning horizon in generation i on the joy-
of-giving bequests ( , i H b ) after  H periods. The household problem is to maximize 
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where 1≤H≤T, and  { } = min , w J T H  
 
The wealth of the representative agent in generation i can still be represented by (2.3) 
where τ =i,….i+(H-1). The first order conditions derived in Paper 4 still hold (with 
the notations replaced as above). With the utility functions taking the same functional 
form as before, the solution of the model is represented by the same equations as 




For both the models to generate exactly the same results, individuals should share the 
same  consumption,  leisure,  saving,  and  wealth  profile  for  the  common  periods 
(planning  horizon).  In  such  a  case,  the  consumption,    saving,  leisure  and  wealth 
profiles of the short lived individuals are truncated, truncated at the length of planning 
horizon, consumption, saving, leisure and wealth profiles of the long lived individual.  
 
To clarify it further, consider two individuals in generations i where one lives and 
plans for T years and the other for Z<T years. Consider a hypothetical wealth profile 
given in the following figure, Figure 2.  
 
 





Both of the individuals share the same wealth profile for the common (first Z) years. 
Although  both  of  them  share  the  same  wealth  profile,  they  leave  different  sized 
bequests at the end of life. In the model with homogenous agents, if an individual was 
planning for T periods and accidentally died after Z adult periods, the wealth left 
behind  was  referred to as an accidental  bequest  (=  bi,Z in the hypothetical  wealth 
profile above), whereas here the individual actually knows the time of death and leave 
the same accidental bequest as joy-of-giving transfer (=bi,Z in the hypothetical wealth 
profile above).  
 
The parameter that affects the joy-of-giving bequests is  w . Thus we can derive a 
restriction on  , i Z w  which generates the same level of joy-of-giving bequests after Z 
periods as accidental bequests under the model with homogenous agents. 
 
As the optimal consumption of a representative agent with planning horizon T ( τ , , i T c ) 
is given by  
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and that of a representative agent with planning horizon Z,  τ , , i Z c  ,  by  
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  (5.1) 
when Z→T,  ￿ ￿
, , i Z i T V V → ,  ￿ ￿
, , i Z i T   →   and  , , 0 i Z i T w w ® = . 
 
It is worth noting that equation (5.1) allows for the possibility of negative bequests 
which are observed in actual data as well (Lutz 2002). 
 
This exercise indicates that if there are T types of individuals in generation i who 
differ in the length of their life span and planning horizon (1 to T years), they would 
share  the  same  consumption,  saving  and  wealth  profiles  for  the  common  period 
provided condition (5.1) holds. For  0 Z T ≤ ≤ the wealth profile, as in Figure 2, is the 
optimal  joy-of-giving  bequests  profile  of  the  heterogenous  agents  (with  planning 
horizon on the x-axis and joy-of-giving bequests on the y-axis).  
 
This implies that a single profile can represent the profiles of all the T heterogeneous 
cohorts in each generation. This greatly simplifies the model and reduces the  T T ×  
overlapping generations model to a relatively simple T overlapping generations. Thus, 
with condition (5.1) in place, we can still use the model with homogenous agents and 
interpret bequests as optimal joy-of-giving, given our understanding of the model with 
heterogeneous agents. 
 
With  the  model  with  heterogeneous  agents  in  mind,  it  will  not  be  appropriate  to 
interpret all the bequests in the model with homogenous agents as accidental. In the 
same fashion it is not appropriate to interpret all the bequests as optimal joy-of-giving. 
Both these specifications are polar cases and the actual situation may be somewhere 
in-between, as the economy may consist of heterogeneous agents having planning 
horizons longer than the actual life. So how do we interpret bequests generated by the 
model? It is purely an empirical question. It is possible to generate any combinations 
of joy-of-giving and accidental bequests using a hybrid model, a hybrid of the model 
with homogenous agents and the one with heterogeneous agent. Since the proportion 
of homogenous and heterogeneous  agents in the economy  is not  known, it is not 
immediately  clear  what  proportion  of  the  aggregate  bequests  are  unintended 
accidental  bequests  and  what  proportion  are  intended  joy-of-giving.  Some  policy 
simulation can still be carried out using hypothetical proportions which is outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
As clear from equation (5.1),  , i Z ω  changes with age (makes a hump shape) which is 
unlikely to find empirical support. This could be a valid point of criticism. A re- 
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interpretation of equation (5.1) in the context of lifetime uncertainty can be of value to 
get away with the shape of  , i Z ω  profile.  
  
Let  , i Z ω  be the weight placed on the stock of wealth to be accumulated at each point 
in time over the lifecycle to be transferred to the future as a buffer stock of wealth to 
provide for their consumption if they survive to the periods ahead and intentional joy-
of-giving bequest at the end of the planning horizon. The individual may die before or 
after the planed horizon. If he/she dies before the anticipated lifetime, the wealth left 
behind can be bifurcated into joy-of-giving bequests (that were to be bequeathed at 
the end of the planning horizon) and (the excess as) accidental bequests. If he/she 
accidentally lives beyond the anticipated age, all or part of the joy-of-giving bequests 
are accidentally consumed. 
 
To clarify this, consider Figure 3. The figure bifurcates total bequests into joy-of-
giving and accidental bequests for an individual whose planning goes till the age of 75 
(point A) but may die earlier than that (say at the age of 60 at point B) or live longer 
(say till the age of 85 at point C). If the individual happens to live till the age of 75, 
he/she lives  ,75 i b  as joy-of-giving bequests as at point A. At point B, the individual 
dies at the age of 60 before the fully anticipated age and leaves a total bequests of 
,60 i b . Part of this bequest is the joy-of-giving bequest that was to be bequeathed at the 
age  of  75.  Thus,  ,75 i b   can  be  interpreted  as  the  joy-of-giving  bequest  and  the 
remaining  ( ,60 i b - ,75 i b )  as  accidental  bequest.  Similarly,  at  point  C,  the  individual 
happens to survive beyond the anticipated age of 75 and “accidentally consume” some 
of the joy-of-giving bequests. Thus, accidental bequests in this case are the consumed 
joy-of-giving bequests which are negative. The un-consumed joy-of-giving bequests 
can therefore be counted as intentional bequests. At age 100, all of the joy-of-giving 
bequests are accidentally consumed. 
 
Figure 3: Bifurcating total bequests into Accidental and Joy-of-giving Bequests 
(Acc Beq= Accidental bequests and JOG Beq= Joy-of-giving bequests) 
 
,60 i b  
60  75  85  100 
,75 i b  
,85 i b  
JOG Beq = ,75 i b  
Acc Beq = 0  
Total Beq =  ,75 i b  
 
JOG Beq = ,85 i b  
Acc Beq =  ,85 ,75 i i b b −  
Total Beq = ,85 i b  
 
Planning horizon 
JOG Beq = ,85 i b  
Acc Beq =  ,60 ,75 i i b b −   














6. Comparison with Models with lifetime Uncertainty: 
This section compares the base case model of the paper with a model that explicitly 
acknowledges lifetime uncertainty where people discount the future by a rate of time 
preference and by a survival probability. It also investigates into the role of annuity 
markets. In order to do so let us outline the model with lifetime uncertainty. 
 
Consider a model with exogenous labour supply with, for simplicity, zero joy-of-
giving bequests and no children. Results of the analysis below equally apply to a 
model with endogenous labour supply. 
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subject to the period-to-period budget constraint 
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, , i a s τ  is the age and time-specific conditional survival probability of an individual aged 









=∏ the  unconditional  survival  probability.  Labour  income  ( , i y τ )  and 
accidental bequests ( ,
a
i b τ ) are zero after retirement, whereas pension income ( ￿
, i PN τ) is 
zero before retirement. 
 
Annuity markets are perfect as reflected by left hand side of the budget constraint.  
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The  base  case  model  of  the  paper  will  give  exactly  the  same  expression.  Thus, 
introducing  lifetime  uncertainty  does  not  affect  evolution  of  consumption  when 
annuity markets are perfect. 
 
Whereas  the  Euler equation  determines  the evolution  of consumption, saving  and 
wealth profiles, the levels are determined by the following lifetime budget constraint 
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If the levels are fixed at the actual (as we do in our simulations) a model with lifetime 




In the base case model of the paper wealth left in the event of death before the end of 
the  planning  horizon  was  distributed  as  accidental  bequest  shared  equally  by  the 
working population. In the model with lifetime uncertainty and actuarially fair perfect 
annuity markets the accidental-wealth is left to the assurance firms. When one thinks 
of these firms as entities owned by the working population, the income stream is the 
same  as  the  accidental  bequests  stream.  Thus,  it  becomes  just  a  matter  of 
interpretation. 
 
The  argument can be extended to a  more complex case where an annuity pays a 
stream of income and a lump sum to children of the deceased at the year of death. 
This structure will be equivalent to our base case model with positive joy-of-giving 
bequests. 
 
After establishing equivalence of  the  model with  lifetime uncertainty  with perfect 
annuity markets, let us now consider the model with lifetime uncertainty where there 
are no annuity markets. This is probably a more realistic case as annuity markets are 
found to be thin (Bateman, Kingston, and Piggott (2001), and Doyle, Mitchell and 
Piggott  (2004)). Particularly, in  Australia,  very  few people  buy genuine longevity 
annuities. In 1999, only 3 percent of the Australian retiring each year purchased a life 
annuity (Doyle, Mitchell and Piggott, (2004)).  
 
The  following  demonstrates  that  models  without  annuity  markets  and  lifetime 
uncertainty will give exactly the same results as the base case model of the paper. 
This is because of the way we fix the consumption unit profile,  τ , i p . All that we need 
to do is derive a set of new consumption profile, say  ￿ τ , i p , that, for a given set of  
survival probabilities, generates the same distribution of consumption by age as the 
actual in Australia in 1997 (in the same manner as we did in the base case model of 
the paper). 
 
In such a model households maximize 
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subject to the budget constraint without annuity markets 
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  (6.6) 
The first term on the right hand side is the extra term that affects the evolution of 
consumption, saving and wealth.  
 
Recall that we fix consumption units profile through simulations such that the optimal 
distribution of consumption by age closely approximates the actual distribution of 
consumption  by  age  in  1997.  For  given  values  of  survival  probabilities,  the 
consumption and leisure units profiles for the model will be different from the base 
case model of the paper. From the results of the base case model we can calculate the 
new  τ , i p ( ￿ τ , i p ) for a given set of survival probabilities spread over the lifecycle ( τ π , i )  
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that reduces the Euler equation to the one derived from the base case model. Precisely 













−     =       
  (6.7) 
where  τ , i p  are the consumption units profiles obtained from the base case model. 
Since  τ π , i <1, the new consumption units profile is steeper than the base case model.  
 
As was our intention, substituting (6.7) in (6.6) will reduce the Euler equation to the 
one in the base case model.  The budget constraint, equation (6.5), is the same as in 
the base case model of the paper. This is because both specifications are characterized 
by the absence of annuity markets. 
 
Because the Euler equation and budget constraint are the same as in the base case 
model, a model with lifetime uncertainty and imperfect annuity markets will give 
exactly the same results as the base case model of the paper if consumption units 
profiles are fixed such that the optimal distribution of consumption by age closely 
follow  the  actual  for  Australia  in  1997.  Because  there  are  no  annuity  markets, 
accidental-wealth in this model, like the base case model, are distributed as accidental 
bequests. 
 
Irrespective of what is implied by the discussion above, let us, for a moment, assume 
that the lifecycle profiles generated by the two models are different, there is still a 
reason why they may give quantitatively close results. The logic goes like this. In a 
steady state the time paths of national saving, investment, current account balance and 
bequest as percentage of GDP are flat. In the non-steady state it is the shift in the 
profile that affects evolution of the time paths on the variables including bequests. For 
similar  values  of  the  parameter,  the  aggregate  effect  of  the  model  may  not  be 
significantly different across the two models. To clarify it further, let us assume that 
the demographic transition have a relatively higher effect in the start of the lifecycle 
than in later years. Since at a given point in time there are generations of different age, 
the  weak  affect  in  one  may(it  may  not)  be  cancelled  out  by  the  strong  effect  in 
aggregate. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
The ratio of retirees to workers in developed countries is expected to increase sharply 
in the next few decades. In the presence of unfunded income support policies, this 
increase in old age dependency is expected to increase the future fiscal burden which 
is seen as a threat to living standards. This paper discuses some of the results obtained 
from  a  multi-period  overlapping  generations  model,  where  individuals  live  for  a 
maximum of 101 years, designed to study the economic impact, and more importantly 
its quantification,  of prospective  ageing. The focus  of the paper is to analyze the 
ability  of  intergenerational  transfers, intentional  and  unintentional,  to alleviate  the 
fiscal burden of ageing. The model is developed with the aim to best work with the 
available data on demographics.  
 
On  theoretical  side,  the  paper  models  four  aspects  of  ageing  economies  that  are 
instrumental  in  assessing  the  impact  of  changing  demographic  structure  on  an  
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economy; one, the proportion of old retired pensioners and young dependents to the 
working  population  (the  so  called  old  and  young  age  dependencies);  two,  the 
changing  productivity  of  individuals  as they  age; three,  the age-varying  nature  of 
consumption and leisure demands (consumption and leisure demands heterogeneity); 
and four, in an economy with altruistic agents or in case of accidental premature 
deaths, the number of bequest recipients (inheritance related support ratio). To this 
end, the paper extends the Miles (1999) model (which is an extension of AK (1987)) 
to a small open economy version with intentional (joy of giving) and unintentional 
(accidental) bequests and with allowance for the age varying nature of consumption 
and leisure demands over the lifecycle (following Cutler et al. 1990 and Guest and 
McDonald (2001)). Like Miles (1999), the state pension is modelled as a pure pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) scheme. 
 
On the applied side, the model is carefully calibrated for a representative small open 
economy  (Australia)  such  that  the  optimal  solution  mimic  the  following  cross 
sectional and times series fundamentals of the economy. 
(viii)  Aggregate bequests as percentage of GDP in year 2000 stay close to the 
empirical estimates for the US economy, 
(ix)  the optimal distribution of consumption by age in 1997 equals the actual 
for Australia, 
(x)  the optimal value of GDP in year 2000 equals the actual for Australia 
(xi)  optimal  national  saving,  investment,  and  current  account  balance  as 
percentage of GDP during 1990 to 2003 mimic the actual for Australia, 
(xii)  the  optimal  gap  between  gross  national  saving  and  net  national  saving 
emulates the actual for Australia during 1990 to 2003.  
(xiii)  the  optimal  value  of  capital  output  ratio  approximate  the  actual  for 
Australia in period 1990 to 2003, and 
(xiv)  the average number of hours worked per week in year 2000 equals 40 
when labour supply is endogenous. 
Calculation based on steady state simulations suggests that a bequest to GDP ratio of 
1% will offset about 33.3 % of the fiscal burden when measured as a % of simple 
labour income and 8.9% of the fiscal burden when measured as % of the full income. 
Conversely, a bequest to GDP ration of 3% (11.1%) will offset all of the fiscal burden 
measured a present value of the simple (full) labour-income over the lifecycle.  
 
Simulations, for alternative population projections, show that aggregate bequests as 
percentage of GDP are expected to increase sharply as the economy ages. Aggregate 
bequests as percentage of GDP in year 1990, in the endogenous labour model, are half 
a percentage point above the upper bound of the empirical estimates derived by Lutz 
(2002) for the US economy and less than half a percentage point below the estimates 
derived  by  Auerbach  et  al.  (1999).  However,  when  labour  supply  is  exogenous, 
optimal aggregate bequests as percentage  of GDP in 1990 are less than 0.5 (1.5) 
percentage points above the estimates arrived at by Auerbach et al (Lutz) for the US 
economy. 
 
Intergenerational accounting suggests that the empirically plausible intergenerational 
transfers are strong enough to offset most of the tax burden (80% and above) when the  
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tax burden is measured as present value of the lifetime tax payment out of the labour 
income and some (approximately 1/4 and above) when the fiscal burden is measured 
as percentage of the full income. In the endogenous labour supply case, 81 to 91 
percent of the fiscal burden of ageing (as % of labour income) will be alleviated by 
inheritances in the base case. These estimates come even stronger when we consider 
simulations with low fertility or when labour supply is exogenous. 
 
Even though the all the bequests generated by the base case model are accidental in 
nature, the paper argues that it is possible to interpret these bequests, all or some, as 
joy of giving there by comparing the model with an alternative specification where 
individuals have heterogeneous planning horizon. Similarly the paper also analytically 
demonstrates that, due to the calibration strategy adopted, results of the simulations 
are  robust  to  the  introduction  of  lifetime  uncertainty  in  the  model  where  people 
discount  the  future  by  a  rate  of  time  preference  and  by  a  survival  probability 
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Table 2: Fixing values of parameters and exogenous variables 
Note: See Khan(2006) for calibrated values of the parameters when labour supply is 
exogenous. 
  Description  Value  Comments/Source 
α  share of capital in output  1/3  Stylized 
ξ  intertemporal elasticity of substitution  0.75 
h   Intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure  0.8 
Miles (1999) 
φ  weight assigned to the utility from 
spending on children  0.85  Khan (2006) 
a  Total factor productivity growth rate  1 %  GM (2001) and Khan (2006) 
A0  The starting value of technology  Set such that the optimal value of GDP in 2000 
equals the actual for Australia 
γ  Parameter quantifying the importance 
of leisure relative to consumption  0.1789  Set such that the average hours worked 
in 2000 per week equals 40 
r  world rate of interest  5.8% 
δ  depreciation rate   5.6 % 
ρ  time rate of preference  5 % 
Set such that  
· optimal NS, Inv, hence CAB, as % 
of GDP mimic the actual for 
Australia in period 1990 to 2003 
· K/Q approximate the actual for 
Australia 
· δ mimics the gap between NS and  
NNS 
ω  weight placed on utility from bequest 
at the end of T adults periods  0  Ensures bequests ( % of GDP) closers 
to empirical estimates 
TC   Age of the eldest young child  16  Khan (2006) 
T  planning horizon on entering the 
labour force  84  101- (TC +1) 
(individuals live for 101 years) 
Tw  the number of working period  48  65-(TC+1) (65 is the retirement age) 
replacement rate (ratio of state pension to 
average labour income) 
26 % of average annual labour income (actual for 




Figure 4: The algorithm used to solve the model in general equilibrium 
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Figure 5: The actual and optimal distribution of 
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Figure 6: Consumption efficiency weights over 
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Figure 7: National saving, net national saving, 
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Figure 9: Aggregate Bequests as % of GDP when 





























































































Figure 10: Aggregate bequests as % of GDP 

































































































Figure  11:  PAYG  tax  rate  and  aggregate 
bequests  as  %  of  GDP  when  labour  supply  is 
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Figure 12: PAYG tax rate and aggregate 
bequests as % of GDP when labour supply is 
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Figure  13: Distribution  of   bequests  by age in 
selected  years  as  %  of  GDP  (from  the  model 
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Figure 14: Present value of bequests as % of 
the present value of PAYG taxes (calculated as 































































Figure 15: Present value of bequests as % of the 
present value of PAYG taxes(calculated as % of 












































































Figure 16: Present value of bequests as % of the 
present value of PAYG taxes(calculated as % of 
full-income) by generation (endogenous labour 
supply) 
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